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FROM CRIMINALIZATION TO
REGULATION: NEW CLASSIFICATIONS
OF CANNABIS NECESSITATE REFORM
OF UNITED NATIONS DRUG TREATIES
INTRODUCTION
The world has failed to come to terms with cannabis as a drug.
In some countries, cannabis use and trafficking are taken very
seriously, while in others they are virtually ignored. This in-
congruity undermines the credibility of the international sys-
tem, and the time for resolving global ambivalence on the issue
is long overdue. Either the gap between the letter and spirit of
the Single Convention, so manifest with cannabis, needs to be
bridged, or parties to the Convention need to discuss re-defin-
ing the status of cannabis.1
he preceding excerpt from the United Nations Office on
Drugs and Crime’s (“UNODC”) annual World Drug Report
in 2006 illustrates a growing controversy in the international
community about the status of cannabis. Since the mid-1970s,
countries have been relaxing their drug laws by enacting decrim-
inalization and depenalization statutes for cannabis,2 due to the
prevailing view that the prior prohibitionist stance is a failure3
1. U.N. OFFICE ONDRUGS&CRIME,WORLDDRUGREPORT 2006, at 186, U.N.
Sales No.E.06.XI.10 (2006). [hereinafter 2006 Report].
2. Decriminalization reforms change the status of cannabis use from a
criminal to a noncriminal offense. Depenalization occurs when there is a
change in the letter or practice of the law that reduces the severity of the crim-
inal or civil penalties. ARI ROSMARIN & NIAMH EASTWOOD, RELEASE A QUIET
REVOLUTION: DRUG DECRIMINALISATION POLICIES IN PRACTICE ACROSS THE
GLOBE 11 (2012), http://drogriporter.hu/files/drogriporter/imce/release-quiet-
revolution-drug-decriminalisation-policies.pdf.
3. GLOBAL COMM’N ON DRUG POLICIES, WAR ON DRUGS (2011). The report
was developed by global leaders, including Kofi Annan, former Secretary Gen-
eral of the United Nations, Cesar Gaviria, former President of Colombia, Ern-
esto Zedillo, former President of Mexico, and Fernando Henrique Cardoso, for-
mer President of Brazil, and advocated for an end to the prohibition of canna-
bis. See generally id. Kofi Annan stated that “The global war on drugs has
failed, with devastating consequences for individuals and societies around the
world . . . . End the criminalization, marginalization and stigmatization of peo-
ple who use drugs but who do not harm others.” Id. at 2. See also Juan Forero,
Latin American Countries Pursue Alternatives to U.S. Drug War,WASH. POST,
Apr. 10, 2012, http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/the_americas/latin-
T
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and has led to increased global violence.4 Attention has focused
on cannabis because, while cannabis smokers account for ap-
proximately 75 to 80 percent of all global illegal drug users,5 the
drug is one of the least toxic substances used recreationally.6
Since the 2006 report, more nations and states have imple-
mented, or at least seriously discussed, more tolerant drug poli-
cies, which extend beyond the legal framework of the current
global drug control regime. The United States led the way when
Colorado and Washington voters on November 6, 2012, passed
referenda to legalize the production, distribution, and sale of
cannabis.7 While those state laws are contrary to federal laws,
Attorney General Eric Holder announced on August 29, 2013,
that the federal government would not interfere with state gov-
ernments’ implementation of these ballot initiatives.8 Then, on
December 10, 2013, Uruguay became the first nation to legalize
american-countries-pursue-alternatives-to-us-drug-
war/2012/04/10/gIQAFPEe7S_story.html.
4. E.g., Peter Imbusch et. al., Violence Research in Latin America and the
Caribbean: A Literature Review, 5 INT’L J. CONFLICT&VIOLENCE 87, 108 (2011).
(noting four ways that drug flow aggravates crime and violence throughout the
Americas. “First of all, they produce local drug use problems, thus resulting in
secondary effects on domestic crime problems. Second, drug transactions often
involve firearms, and firearms are traded for drugs. Third, movement of drugs
nearly inevitably leads to a certain corruption of local law enforcement offi-
cials. Fourth, the laundering of the revenues undermines legitimate economic
activities.”); WORLD BANK [WB], CRIME AND VIOLENCE IN CENTRAL AMERICA: A
DEVELOPMENT CHALLENGE, at ii (2011). (concluding that “drug trafficking is
both an important driver of homicide rates in Central America and the main
single factor behind rising violence levels.”)
5. Org. of Am. States: General Secretariat, The Drug Problems In The
Americas, at 65, OEA/Ser.D/XXV.4 (May 17, 2013).
6. ROBINROOM ET AL., CANNABIS POLICY: MOVINGBEYOND THE STALEMATE 1
(2008) (The “probability and scale of harm among heavy cannabis users is mod-
est compared with that caused by many other psychoactive substances, both
legal and illegal, in common use, namely, alcohol [and] tobacco.”).
7. Jack Healy, Voters Ease Marijuana Laws in 2 States, but Legal Ques-
tions Remain, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 7, 2012, http://www.ny-
times.com/2012/11/08/us/politics/marijuana-laws-eased-in-colorado-and-wash-
ington.html?_r=0.
8. OFFICE OF THE DEPUTY ATT’Y GEN., MEMORANDUM FOR ALL UNITED
STATES ATTORNEYS: GUIDANCE REGARDING MARIJUANA ENFORCEMENT (2013)
[hereinafter MEMORANDUM].
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the production, distribution, and sale of cannabis.9 These early
measures have gained international momentum to the point
where there are now twelve states10 and seven countries with
proposals to legalize cannabis in the next few years.11
These recent laws have weakened the present international
regime that favors prohibition over regulation. These laws are
in direct violation of the Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs of
1961 and the 1988 United Nations Convention Against Illicit
Traffic on Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances, both of
which ban the legal sale of cannabis for nonmedical use and task
signatories to implement a domestic system for limiting the use
9. Matt Sledge, How Uruguay Legalized Marijuana Dealing, HUFFINGTON
POST (Dec. 12, 2013, 2:16 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/12/12/uru-
guay-marijuana-legalization_n_4433971.html.
10. The New Hampshire house passed similar legislation to legalize canna-
bis. Steven Nelson, Live Free and High: New Hampshire House Votes to Legal-
ize Pot, U.S. NEWS (Jan. 15, 2014, 5:58 PM), http://www.usnews.com/news/ar-
ticles/2014/01/15/new-hampshire-house-votes-to-legalize-pot. Maryland and
New York legislators are also considering a proposed cannabis legalization bill.
Pat Warren, Bill Would Regulate and Tax Marijuana Like Alcohol in Mary-
land, CBS BALTIMORE (Jan. 16, 2014, 6:35 PM), http://baltimore.cbslo-
cal.com/2014/01/16/maryland-marijuana-bill-will-regulate-tax-cannabis-like-
alcohol/; Saki Knafo, New York Could Be Third State to Legalize Pot,
HUFFINGTON POST (Dec. 11, 2013, 12:35 PM), http://www.huffing-
tonpost.com/2013/12/11/new-york-legalize-marijuana_n_4426553.html. Ari-
zona, California, Massachusetts, Maine, Montana, Nevada, and Wyoming are
trying to gather enough signatures to place cannabis legalization questions on
their 2014 and 2016 ballots. Faith Karimi, Alaska Closer to Becoming 3rd State
to Legalize Recreational Marijuana, CNN (Jan. 9, 2014, 8:10 AM),
http://www.cnn.com/2014/01/09/us/alaska-recreational-marijuana-push/.
Thomas H. Clarke, Wyoming Marijuana Legalization Initiative Submitted for
2016 Ballot, DAILY CHRONIC (Jan. 15, 2014, 1:15 PM),
http://www.thedailychronic.net/2014/27195/wyoming-marijuana-legalization-
initiative-submitted-2016-ballot/.
11. Switzerland, Spain, Czech Republic, Denmark, Netherlands, Morocco,
and Ireland are currently considering legalizing marijuana. Ethan
Nadelmann,What Legalizing Pot in Uruguay Means for the World, TIME (Aug.
2, 2013), http://ideas.time.com/2013/08/02/what-legalizing-pot-in-uruguay-
means-for-the-world/; Ireland May Be the Next Country to Legalize Recrea-
tional Marijuana Use, HUFFINGTON POST (Nov. 11, 2013), http://www.huffing-
tonpost.com/the-/ireland-may-be-the-next-c_b_4251992.html. Guatemala is
also considering legalizing marijuana. Jaime Septien, En 2015, La Marihuana
y la Amapola Podrian ser Legales en Guatemala, ALETEIA (Apr. 11, 2014),
http://www.aleteia.org/es/politica/noticias/en-2015-la-marihuana-y-la-
amapola-podrian-ser-legales-en-guatemala-6165259760959488.
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of cannabis.12 Even though individual countries are changing
their views on cannabis, the UNODC still urges the stringent
regulation of cannabis as a result of the drug’s increased po-
tency, addictive quality, and connection to mental illness.13 Fur-
thermore, two intergovernmental bodies, the International Nar-
cotics Control Board (“INCB”) and the UNODC, have repeatedly
stated that these laws break international treaty obligations.14
In the wake of this disagreement among individual nations and
intergovernmental agencies, the U.N. General Assembly will
hold a special session to reconsider the international approach
to drug policy in early 2016.15
This Note argues that, as states increasingly propose and pass
cannabis legislation that directly contradicts current U.N. trea-
ties, future international compliance will be possible only
through changes in, or abandonment of, the current regime.
12. Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs, 1961, Mar. 30, 1961, 18 U.S.T.
1407, 520 U.N.T.S. 204 (entered into force Dec. 13, 1964); Protocol Amending
the Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs, Mar. 25, 1972, 26. U.S.T. 1439, 976
U.N.T.S. 3 (entered into force Aug. 8, 1975) [hereinafter Single Convention];
United Nations Convention against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psy-
chotropic Substances, Dec. 19, 1988, 28 I.L.M. 493 [hereinafter 1988 Conven-
tion].
13. See generally 2006 Report, supra note 1, at 155–99; Discussion Paper,
U.N. Office on Drugs & Crime, Cannabis: A Short Review (2011).
14. Press Release, International Narcotics Control Board, INCB President
calls on the U.S. Government to address initiatives aimed at permitting recre-
ational drug use, U.N. Press Release UNIS/NAR/1164 (Mar. 14, 2013); Press
Release, International Narcotics Control Board, Uruguay is Breaking the In-
ternational Convention on Drug Control with the Cannabis Legislation Ap-
proved by its Congress, U.N. Press Release UNIS/NAR/1190 (Dec. 11, 2013);
U.N. Office of Drugs and Crime, Statement on the Bill Regulating the Produc-
tion, Sale and Consumption of Marijuana in Uruguay (Aug. 1, 2013),
https://www.unodc.org/lpo-brazil/en/frontpage/2013/08/01-statement-on-the-
bill-regulating-the-production-sale-and-consumption-of-marijuana-in-uru-
guay.html; U.N. International Narcotics Control Board, Statement by Presi-
dent of the International Narcotics Control Board, Thematic Debate of the
Sixty-Sixth Session of the General Assembly on Drugs and Crime as a Threat
to Development on the Occasion of the International Day Against Drug Abuse
and Illicit Trafficking, UN/V.12-54687(E) (June 26, 2012).
15. La Asamblea General De La ONU Aprueba Resolucion Presentada Por
Mexico Sobre Cooperacion Internacional Contra Las Drogas [The U.N. General
Assembly Approves Resolution Presented by Mexico on International Cooper-
ation Against Drugs], Secretaria de Relaciones Exteriores, 27 de Noviembre de
2012 (Mex.), available at http://saladeprensa.sre.gob.mx/index.php/comunica-
dos/2149-351.
2015] INTERNATIONAL CANNABIS REGULATION 651
Therefore, this Note suggests that the United Nations adopt a
new convention for cannabis in order to reconcile the significant
inconsistences between the current treaty and new domestic pol-
icies, the latter of which establish a regulated cannabis market.
Part I provides an overview of the U.N. drug control treaties,
including an explanation of the reasons for the strict regulation
of cannabis. Part II outlines new domestic legislative challenges
to the treaties, with particular attention focused on the reasons
for the global shift from the prohibition of cannabis to its legali-
zation. Part III examines four possible ways to remedy the di-
chotomy between the current domestic trend to legalize cannabis
and international law. Part IV concludes that the United Na-
tions should create a new treaty dealing specifically with the
regulation of cannabis.
I. THE INTERNATIONAL CANNABIS CONTROL SYSTEM
The framework of international drug control evolved over the
past century, beginning with the International Opium Conven-
tion of 1912 and continuing through 2014.16 There are two inter-
national drug control treaties currently in effect17 that directly
address cannabis: The 1961 Single Convention on Narcotic
Drugs, as amended by the 1972 Protocol (“Single Convention”),18
and the 1988 United Nations Convention Against Illicit Traffic
in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances (“1988 Conven-
tion”).19 These treaties have among the highest rates of adher-
ence of any multilateral treaty, with 186 and 182 signatories re-
spectively, showing a near universal recognition of the need to
16. Antonio Costa, Executive Director of the U.N. Office of Drugs & Crime,
A Century of International Drug Control, 1, 49 (2009). [Hereinafter Costa].
17. The Convention on Psychotropic Substances of 1971, a third interna-
tional drug treaty, will not be discussed in this Note because of its focus on
controlling psychotropic substances rather than cannabis. Cannabis is indi-
rectly controlled by the treaty as a result of the registration of Tetrahydrocan-
nabinol (“THC”), the main active ingredient in cannabis, as a Schedule I ingre-
dient. Convention on Psychotropic Substances, opened for signature Feb. 21,
1971, 32 U.S.T. 543, 1019 U.N.T.S. 157 [hereinafter 1971 Convention]. For a
detailed analysis of this treaty, see Neil Boister, Decriminalizing Personal Use
of Cannabis in New Zealand: The Problems and Possibilities of International
Law, 3 Y.B. NEW ZEALAND JURISPRUDENCE 55, 61–62 (1999) [hereinafter New
Zealand].
18. Single Convention, supra note 12.
19. 1988 Convention, supra note 12.
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regulate narcotics internationally.20 The treaties focus on the
need to control cannabis’ production, supply, and consumption,
through punitive sanctions and regulation, in order to combat
the illicit drug market.21 This section will explore the develop-
ment of the drug treaties, including the reasons for such strict
regulation of cannabis, compared to more toxic narcotics. An
overview of the development of the treaties explains not only
why cannabis is controlled in the manner it is, but also why sig-
natory states, and the United Nations, are resistant to change.
A. Tracing the Development of International Drug Treaties
Beginning in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centu-
ries, national and international initiatives began to regulate
cannabis as a pain reliever, as part of an overall trend to in-
crease the supervision of medicinal products.22 During the First
International Opium Conference in 1911 and 1912, the first at-
tempt at an international ban of cannabis was supported only by
Italy and the United States.23 While the first treaty failed to in-
clude cannabis as a drug needing regulation, the committee rec-
ommended that the countries further examine the character of
cannabis in order to determine whether future regulation would
be warranted.24 The United States believed that the failure to
20. Exec. Director of the U.N. Office on Drugs & Crime, Commission on Nar-
cotic Drugs, Making Drug Control ‘Fit for Purpose’: Building on the UNGASS
Decade, 3, U.N. Doc. E/CN.7/2008/1 (Mar. 7, 2008), available at
https://www.unodc.org/documents/commissions/CND-Session51/CND-
UNGASS-CRPs/ECN72008CRP17.pdf [hereinafter Fit For Purpose].
21. Single Convention, supra note 12; 1988 Convention, supra note 12.
22. In Germany, the sale of cannabis was limited to pharmacies by the Phar-
macy Ordinance of 1972. Danilo Bollotta, et al, Cannabis Control in Europe, in
A CANNABIS READER: GLOBAL ISSUES AND LOCAL EXPERIENCES 97, 100–01 (Sha-
ron Rodner Sznitman et al. eds., 2008). In the United States, the Pure Food
and Drug Act of 1906 mandated that any quantity of cannabis be clearly
marked on the label of any drug or food sold to the public. Other drafts of na-
tional legislation to regulate cannabis further failed, probably because of oppo-
sition in the pharmaceutical industry. David F. Musto, The 1937 Marijuana
Tax Act, inMARIJUANA: MEDICAL PAPERS 1839-1972, 419, 419–22 (2007).
23. Bollotta, supra note 22, at 101; The U.S. Delegate, Henry J. Finger,
stated that cannabis should be banned in legislation proposed by this confer-
ence, because many Californians were scared of the “large influx of Hindoos . .
. demanding cannabis indica” and who were trying to initiate “the whites into
their habit.” Musto, supra note 22, at 422.
24. Id.
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include cannabis was proof of international betrayal and an at-
tempt to nullify U.S. efforts.25 Other countries, such as Egypt,
Turkey, and Greece, shared this U.S. sentiment and began crim-
inalizing cannabis26 as a means to exert social control over Su-
fis,27 whose use of the drug made them unfaithful Muslims and
an “unproductive burden on society.”28
Cannabis first became regulated internationally at the Second
International Opium Convention in 1925, as a result of strong
political pressure by Egypt.29 The treaty, however, controlled
cannabis only with respect to transnational trade30 and less com-
prehensively than other drugs such as opium, heroin, and co-
caine.31 The weakness of that regulation was partially due to the
fact that British and French delegations did not have adequate
time to conduct due diligence in their research of cannabis.32Del-
egates from the United States and Egypt refused to sign because
of inadequate oversight for hashish.33
Despite the controversy over the inclusion of cannabis in the
arena of international drug control, European countries began
criminalizing domestic possession and use more stringently
25. Id. at 424.
26. Bollotta, supra note 22, at 100–01. (noting that Egypt made hashish a
capital offense in 1868, Turkey made cultivation of cannabis a criminal offense
in 1884, and Greece banned the cultivation, importation, and usage of cannabis
in 1890).
27. Sufism is a branch of Islam defined by adherence to the idea of an inner,
mystical dimension of Islam. JOHN L. ESPOSITO, Sufism in America, in THE
OXFORDDICTIONARY OF ISLAM (Oxford Univ. Press 2014).
28. Dr. J. Bouquet, U.N. Office of Drugs & Crime, Cannabis (concluded)
(Jan. 1, 1951), available at https://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/data-and-analy-
sis/bulletin/bulletin_1951-01-01_1_page005.html.
29. Costa, supra note 16, at 53–55. Egyptian Delegate M. El Guindy gave
an emotional speech at the conference about the negative medical repercus-
sions of cannabis. He claimed that, “the portion of cases of insanity caused by
the use of hashish varies from 30 to 60 percent of the total number of cases
occurring in Egypt.” Id at 54.
30. David Bewley-Taylor & Martin Jelsma, Fifty Years of the 1961 Single
Convention on Narcotic Drugs: A Reinterpretation, 12 TRANSNAT’L INST. SERIES
ON LEGISLATIVE REFORM OFDRUG POLICIES 4 (2011).
31. Costa, supra note 16, at 55.
32. MARTIN BOOTH, CANNABIS: A HISTORY 118 (St. Martin’s Press, 1st ed.
2003).
33. Id.
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than the treaty required.34 In the United States, cannabis, orig-
inally confined to Mexican migrant communities in the south-
western states, began spreading in the 1920s to minority and
low income populations in urban areas.35 After several states in-
dependently criminalized cannabis, The Federal Marihuana Tax
Act of 1937 finally banned unlicensed and nonmedical cannabis
throughout the United States.36
In conjunction with these individualized, national efforts, the
1936 Geneva Convention for the Suppression of the Illicit Traffic
in Dangerous Drugs focused on establishing expansive guide-
lines for penal sanctions that would harmonize domestic drug
offenses and penalties.37 However, the treaty never became law
because many delegates objected to the incorporation of interna-
tional criminal law provisions that would alter domestic legisla-
tion.38 Other countries, such as the United States, objected be-
cause they desired even stricter regulation.39 Though scuttled,
34. Examples of some European legislation include the United Kingdom’s
Dangerous Drugs Act, 1928 and Germany’s second Opium Law, 1929. Bollotta,
supra note 22, at 101.
35. Richard J. Bonnie & Charles Whitebread, THEMARIJUANA CONVICTION:
A HISTORY OF MARIJUANA PROHIBITION IN THE UNITED STATES 1, 92 (U. of VA
Press 1974); Even though still not used by mainstream society, newspapers
began sensationalizing marijuana through slogans such as “Loco Weed,
Breeder of Madness and Crime” and “Marihuana as a Developer of Criminals”
at the request of prominent political leaders, such as Harry Anslinger, the head
of the Bureau of Narcotics. Musto, supra note 22, 425.
36. Booth, supra note 32, at 154. By 1937, thirty-eight of the nation’s then
forty-eight states had banned cannabis. Id. at 149.
37. The new treaty ensured the enactment of domestic legislative provisions
by each party for the severe punishment of international participation in, con-
spiracy in, attempts toward and preparatory acts toward the commission of
illicit drug trafficking, and, if domestic law provided such acts as criminal, for
the illicit cultivation, gathering, and production of drugs. There was an allow-
ance for the extradition of suspected traffickers and the required establish-
ment of related law enforcement measures. NEIL BOISTER, PENAL ASPECTS OF
THEU.N. DRUG CONVENTIONS 32–36 (2001).
38. Id. at 36–39.
39. The U.S. delegation did not sign the Convention because, in their own
words, “[T]he stipulation of the Convention did not tend in any increasing
measure to effectively prevent or adequately punish the illicit traffic.” Boister,
supra note 37, at 36–39. In total only thirteen countries signed and ratified this
convention. Moreover, it only became effective in October, 1939, after the Sec-
ond World War had started, and drug control priorities had been supplanted
by more immediate foreign policy imperatives. Costa, supra note 16, at 57.
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this Convention became the basis of future international drug
laws that are still in effect today.40
B. The Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs, 1961
Preparations for the Single Convention began after the estab-
lishment of the United Nations and the U.N. Commission on
Narcotic Drugs (“CND”) in the 1940s.41 After the Second World
War, the volume of illicit traffic grew exponentially, due to the
introduction of new narcotic substances and the formation of
multinational drug trafficking rings.42 While traditional colonial
powers had been resistant to drug control, because of lucrative
drug monopolies in colonies, the process of decolonization made
the wealthy nations more amenable to strict drug regulation.43
Additionally, the United States, which emerged from the war as
a dominant political and economic power, had more leverage to
promulgate its prohibitive anti-drug ideals.44
In 1948, the U.N. Economic and Social Council (“ECOSOC”)
adopted a CND sponsored resolution drafted by the United
40. Boister, supra note 37, at 39.
41. Id. at 40. The CND initially limited its membership to representatives
of sixteen U.N. member states. A 1961 increase to twenty-one made it possible
for representation of states with drug addiction problems and for election of
non-U.N. members. See U.N. Office on Drugs and Crime, Twenty Years of Nar-
cotic Control Under the United Nations, 1, 6 (Jan. 1, 1966),
http://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/data-and-analysis/bulletin/bulletin_1996-01-
01_1_page002.html [hereinafter Narcotic Control]. The main task of the CND
“is to analyze the global situation on drug control, and when necessary, advise
ECOSOC on changes to enhance the drug control system.” Daniel Heilmann,
The International Control of Illegal Drugs and The U.N. Treaty Regime Pre-
venting or Causing Human Rights Violations, 19 CARDOZO J. INT’L & COMP. L.
237, 254 (2011).
42. Boister, supra note 37, at 41–42.
43. Narcotic Control, supra note 41, at 22; Martin Jelsma, The Development
of International Drug Control: Lessons Learned and Strategic Challenges for
the Future 2 (Global Comm. On Drug Policies, Working Paper, Jan. 24-25,
2011).
44. Id. at 3.
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States to consolidate earlier drug treaties into a single conven-
tion.45 In drafting this new treaty, countries saw it as their mis-
sion to “benefit the health and welfare of mankind”46 by prevent-
ing drug addiction.47 This sentiment was expressed in the pre-
amble, which focused on each nation’s duty to “prevent and com-
bat this evil.” 48 The fact that this was the first time that an in-
ternational treaty used such an emotional word as “evil” to de-
scribe the pressing drug problem, while the global illicit drug use
problem had dramatically increased, shows the rising concern
among world leaders to fight the pressing threat of the drug
trade at the time.49
The Convention classified cannabis as one of the most danger-
ous drugs, on par with heroin.50 Cannabis, cannabis resin, and
the cannabis plant were Schedule I substances subject to all con-
trol measures by the convention because of the risk of depend-
ence and abuse.51 In addition, cannabis and cannabis resin were
included among Schedule IV substances, which were thought to
be particularly dangerous due to their harm, risk of abuse, and
45. Rick Lines, Deliver Us From Evil? – The Single Convention on Narcotic
Drugs, 50 Years On, 1 INT’L J. ONHUM. RTS. & DRUG POL’Y 3, 4, 9–10 (2010).
46. Single Convention, supra note 12, preamble.
47. Lines, supra note 45, at 7, 10 (noting that the Single Convention focuses
on the evil stemming from the need to control individual, private actors rather
than the state or the people acting on behalf of the state.).
48. Single Convention, supra note 12, preamble.
49. Bewley-Taylor, supra note 30, at 6–8.
50. Single Convention, supra note 12, preamble. The convention divides
drugs between four schedules, depending on the perceived toxicity level of
each, as well as the need to control the substance use. Schedule I lists sub-
stances that have liability to abuse comparable to that of cannabis, cannabis
resin, or cocaine. Schedule II lists substances that have addiction-producing
properties not greater than those of codeine, but at least as great as those of
dextropropoxyphene. Schedule III lists substances that are intended for legiti-
mate medical use, and that the WHO considers not liable to abuse, and that
cannot produce ill effects. Schedule IV lists substances that are particularly
liable to abuse and to produce ill effects, and do not offset such liability with
substantial therapeutic advantages not possessed by substances other than
narcotics in Schedule I. Id.
51. Bollotta, supra note 22, at 102.
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extremely limited therapeutic value.52 As a result, the licit pro-
duction of cannabis was limited exclusively to medical and sci-
entific purposes.53
This double classification requires individual nations to adopt
particularly stringent controls to stop cannabis use and trade.54
According to the Single Convention’s Articles 28 and 38, signa-
tory countries should take all practicable measures necessary to
prevent its abuse55 and misuse.56 This allowed countries to adopt
different methods of criminalizing cannabis in order to stop the
drug trade.57 However, the countries only needed to enact legis-
lation that they deemed necessary58 and not in violation of their
constitutions.59 Governments could choose whether to impose
administrative penalties—such as fines, censure, and criminal
sanctions—or to avoid penalties altogether for personal posses-
sion offenses.60 This flexibility does not exist for the production,
cultivation, or sale of cannabis.61
The treaty’s ratification resulted in the first official domestic
arrests for cannabis offenses in the 1960s and 1970s.62Even with
the treaty’s impact, the United States refused to sign and ratify
the treaty until 1967 because of a desire for stricter and more
52. Single Convention, supra note 12, art. 2 (5)(b); Bollotta, supra note 22,
at 102.
53. Single Convention, supra note 12, art. 4(c).
54. Id. art. 33.
55. Id. art. 38.
56. Id. art. 28.
57. U.N. Office of Drugs & Crime, Commentary on the United Nations Con-
vention on Narcotic Drugs 1961, at 346, U.N. Doc. E/CN.7/588 (1972) [herein-
after Commentary on the Single Convention].
58. Bollotta, supra note 22, at 103.
59. Single Convention, supra note 12, art. 26; Room, supra note 6, at 95.
60. Commentary on the Single Convention, supra note 57, at 402. This was
allowed as long as the countries “use their best endeavors to prevent this pos-
session by all those administrative controls of production, manufacture, trade
and distribution, which are required by the Single Convention.”
61. Single Convention, supra note 12, art. 22. The Official Commentary ex-
plains that prohibition is required as long as there is illicit drug traffic. A gov-
ernment that, for many years and despite its best efforts, has been unable to
prevent gross diversion of drugs from cultivation can hardly be of the opinion
that the prohibition of such cultivation would not be “the most suitable meas-
ure . . . for protection of public health and welfare and preventing the diversion
of drugs into the illicit traffic.” Commentary on the Single Convention, supra
note 57, 275–76.
62. Bollotta, supra note 22, at 101.
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widespread criminalization, in order to stop the increasingly un-
desirable drug from gaining more popularity.63 The United
States expressed dissatisfaction with the treaty’s lack of enforce-
ment powers in contrast to a prior treaty allowing an interna-
tional body to impose sanctions on states.64
In 1968, as a result of increased pressure from the United
States, the International Narcotics Control Board (“INCB”), a
thirteen member quasi-judicial body, was created to monitor
states’ compliance with the treaty and to recommend embargos
on noncompliant states.65 Eventually, the Single Convention
was amended through the 1972 Protocol Amending the Single
Convention, which granted the INCB greater law enforcement
powers to seize plants illicitly cultivated, and to permit the ex-
tradition of drug traffickers between the countries that are sig-
natories.66
C. 1988 United Nations Convention Against Illicit Traffic in
Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances
Illegal drug production and use increased throughout the
1970s and 1980s, in spite of the Single Convention.67 In particu-
lar, cannabis was considered the biggest illegal narcotic sub-
stance in quantitative terms,68 and its use spread to mainstream
society.69 As a result of increased global consciousness of the
dangers of illicit trafficking, countries convened to create the
63. Bewley-Taylor, supra note 30, at 14.
64. Id. The 1931 Limitation Convention, a prior drug convention, gave the
Permanent Central Opium Board the authority to place an embargo on the
export of licit drugs to nations exceeding their drug estimates. Id. at 4.
65. Heilman, supra note 41, at 255–56.
66. Bewley-Taylor, supra note 30, at 14; M.C. Bassiouni, The International
Narcotics Control System: A Proposal, 46 ST. JOHN’SL.REV. 713, 749–51 (1972).
67. Costa, supra note 16, at 65, 67; Jelsma, supra note 43, at 5 (noting that
the restriction of previously available narcotics led to the inception of a multi-
billion dollar international drug trafficking business.)
68. Bassiouni, supra note 66, at 755.
69. Booth, supra note 32, at 240. The U.S. approach to cannabis regulation
changed dramatically in the 1960s, when cannabis became used by main-
stream society and shifted from President Nixon’s stance of the drug being con-
sidered “public enemy number one” to President Carter nearly legalizing can-
nabis to President Reagan waging the war on drugs. For a more detailed over-
view see Thomas J. Moran, Just a Little Bit of History Repeating: The Califor-
nia Model of Marijuana Legalization and How it Might Affect Racial and Eth-
nic Minorities? 17 WASH&LEE J. CIVILRTS. & SOC. JUST. 557, 566–70 (2011).
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1988 Convention to expand the scope of the international drug
treaties. 70 The central purpose of the treaty was to “promote co-
operation among parties so that they may address more effec-
tively the various aspects of illicit traffic in narcotic drugs and
psychotropic substances having an international dimension.”71
The treaty requires all signatories to enact criminal offenses
for the manufacturing, distribution, possession, purchase, or cul-
tivation of cannabis.72 The U.S. delegation focused on demand-
ing harsh sanctions for non-personal-use offenses, such as
money laundering and trafficking, and opposed the inclusion of
personal use offenses.73 Because of the perceived focus on drug-
producing countries in Latin America, the Mexican delegation
demanded penalization of personal use so that consumption
countries also had an onus to enact domestic legislation that
would impact their economies as well.74
The tension concerning what activities should be regulated led
to enforcement distinctions between penal provisions on the sup-
ply side and those on the demand side.75 Article 3(2) of the 1988
Convention created a constitutional limitation exception just for
possession, purchase, or cultivation for personal consumption.76
The constitutional limitation arose because of difficulties en-
countered by negotiators in formulating precise definitions ac-
ceptable to different legal systems,77 and out of a desire to safe-
guard state sovereignty.78 The Official Commentary of the 1988
Convention stresses that this treaty’s provisions do not oblige
70. Boister, supra note 37, at 52.
71. 1988 Convention, supra note 12, art. 2.
72. Id. art. 3.
73. Melissa T. Aoyagi, Beyond Punitive Prohibition: Liberalizing the Dia-
logue on International Drug Policy, 37 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 555, 579–80
(2005).
74. Krzysztof Krajewski,How Flexible are the United Nations Drug Conven-
tions” 10 INT’L J. OFDRUG POL’Y 329, 334 (1999).
75. Id.
76. ROOM, supra note 6, at 163.
77. David P. Stewart, Internationalizing The War on Drugs: The U.N. Con-
vention Against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances,
18 DEN. J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 387, 393 (1990).
78. 1988 Convention, supra note 12, art. 2(2).
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any penalty to be imposed for drug consumption per se.79 How-
ever, Article 3(1) requires criminalization of any form of supply,
cultivation, or possession for sale by confiscating the drugs or
extraditing drug traffickers.80 This differentiation insulates
party states from outside pressures when drafting penal provi-
sions for drug users, and allows states, when appropriate, to pro-
vide remedies other than incarceration, such as drug treatment
and rehabilitation.81 In sum, these conventions provide Member
States with the ability to legalize the personal use of cannabis,
but any legalization of the production or sale would be in viola-
tion of these treaty obligations.82
II. THE EVOLUTION OFDOMESTIC CANNABIS LEGALIZATION
STATUTES
Initiatives to liberalize cannabis control began in the 1970s,
when several states in the United States and Netherlands re-
moved criminal penalties for possession of small quantities of
the drug,83 as a result of a general perception that global prohi-
bition was a failure.84
79. U.N. Office of Drugs and Crime, Commentary on the United Nations
Convention Against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Sub-
stances in Vienna on 20 Dec. 1988, at 82, U.N. Doc. E/CN.7/590 (1988) [herein-
after Commentary on the 1988 Convention]. In relation to article 3 “it will be
noted that, as with the 1961 and 1971 Conventions, paragraph 2 does not re-
quire drug consumption as such to be established as a punishable offence.” Id.
80. 1988 Convention, supra note 12, arts. (3)(1), (5), (6); Stewart, supra note
78, at 395–400.
81. Stewart, supra note 78, at 39.
82. 1988 Convention, supra note 12, art. 3; The International Narcotics Con-
trol Board found that the convention does not require criminal prosecution for
possession of small quantities of drugs. UNODC, WORLD DRUG REPORT 2009,
at 167, U.N. Sales No. E.09.XI.12 (2009).
83. Peter Reuter,Why Has US Drug Policy Changed So Little over 30 Years?
42 CRIME & JUST. 75, 92–93 (2013); JEAN-PAUL GRAND & JOOST BREEKSEMA,
OPEN SOC’Y FOUND, COFFEE SHOPS AND COMPROMISE: SEPARATED ILLICIT DRUG
MARKETS IN THENETHERLANDS 1, 18 (2013). The 1976 Opium Act, which sepa-
rated cannabis from other drugs, was not intended to create coffee shop busi-
nesses that are legally permitted to sell cannabis, but they emerged afterwards
and were tolerated through case law and a policy directive regulating the busi-
nesses in 1994. Id. at 23.
84. Grand, supra note 83, at 17–18; NAT’L COMMISSION ON MARIHUANA &
DRUG ABUSE, MARIHUANA: A SIGNAL OFMISUNDERSTANDING (1972).
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These early laws have led to a worldwide phenomenon where
now 25 to 30 percent of countries have decriminalization or de-
penalization statutes for cannabis.85 Although these laws depart
from the prohibition model, they stop short of full legalization
and regulation in order to conform to international drug trea-
ties.86 The Netherlands, which had the most relaxed of the ear-
lier policies, controls the sale of cannabis in certain coffee shops,
but fails to regulate and monitor the cultivation of cannabis.87
As a result, the coffee shops are perceived to have led to in-
creased crime88 and to cultivation of more addictive forms of can-
nabis.89 In recognition of the loopholes caused by the Nether-
lands’ backdoor approach, the new legalization statutes in Colo-
rado, Washington, and Uruguay create a regulatory framework
for the production and sale of cannabis, which puts them in di-
rect conflict with treaty obligations.90 This section compares
these legalization statutes and explains the reasons for their
passage in order to show how these isolated measures might in-
dicate a new global trend.
A. The United States
The 2012 referenda in Colorado and Washington passed in
large part due to the dramatic shift in attitude toward cannabis
in the United States over the last eight years.91 The change in
sentiment is partially due to a shift in demographics, where the
elderly population that most adamantly opposed legalization is
85. ROSMARIN, supra note 2, at 11.
86. Grand, supra note 83, at 18; ARTHURDOMOSTAWSKI, OPEN SOC’Y FOUND,
DRUG POLICY IN PORTUGAL: THEBENEFITS OFDECRIMINALIZINGDRUGUSE 1, 26,
47 (2011).
87. Agence France-Presse, Dutch City of Eindhoven Wants to Grow Their
Own Marijuana, DAILY CHRONIC (Apr, 4, 2013).
88. Id.
89. Bruno Waterfield, Holland to Ban Sale of ‘Skunk’ Marijuana in Coffee
Shops, TELEGRAPH (Nov. 20, 2012, 4:03 PM), http://www.tele-
graph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/netherlands/9690851/Holland-to-ban-
sale-of-skunk-marijuana-in-coffee-shops.html.
90. See Section I.B and C for detailed reasoning of why these new laws are
in direct conflict with U.N. treaties.
91. In 2002, a national survey showed that roughly two-thirds of Americans
opposed legalization of marijuana. Now 52 percent of the population supports
it according to Pew. Majority Now Supports Legalizing Marijuana,
PEWRESEARCHCENTER (April 4, 2013), http://www.people-
press.org/2013/04/04/majority-now-supports-legalizing-marijuana/.
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shrinking, coupled with a growing percentage of adults that ad-
mit to having tried cannabis.92 The change in attitudes also may
be the result of successful medical cannabis initiatives in the
United States, and coffee shops in the Netherlands, which led
the way to introduce more liberal statutes.93 Furthermore, the
states’ largest cities, Denver and Seattle, had already placed
cannabis possession as a low priority for police and prosecu-
tors.94
These referenda also passed for a variety of other reasons, such
as conserving public resources, increasing tax revenue and
avoiding of discriminatory enforcement.95 This support stems
from the prevailing view that the war on drugs is extremely
costly, with approximately $2.6 billion USD of annual govern-
ment funding allocated to cannabis enforcement,96 and nearly
half of all national drug arrests being related to cannabis.97 Fur-
thermore, these initiatives had bipartisan support, even though
the justification given differed based on political ideology; liber-
als mainly viewed this as a moral issue, whereas conservatives
perceive this as a states’ rights issue.98 The decisive votes came
92. Id.
93. See Reuter, supra note 83, at 93–95; There are currently twenty states
and the District of Columbia that have legalized medical marijuana. Jolie Lee
& Karl Gelles, Which States Have Legalized Medical Marijuana? USA TODAY
(Jan. 6, 2014, 4:58 PM), http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation-
now/2014/01/06/marijuana-legal-states-medical-recreational/4343199/.
94. Steven W. Bender, Joint Report?: The Interplay of State, Federal and
Hemispheric Regulation of Recreational Marijuana and the Failed War on
Drugs, 6 ALB. GOV’T. L. 359, 370 (2013). “Denver voters approved an initiative
in 2007 deeming marijuana the city’s ‘lowest’ police priority.” In Seattle, the
Seattle city attorney announced that possession was the lowest priority for
both the Seattle City Attorney’s Office and the Seattle Police Department.
95. See WILLIAM A. GALSTON & E.J. DIOME JR., THE NEW POLITICS OF
MARIJUANA LEGALIZATION: WHYOPINION ISCHANGING 10 (2013).
96. See JEFFREY A MIRON, THE BUDGETARY IMPLICATIONS OF MARIJUANA
PROHIBITION 11, 16 (2005) (finding that in 2002 approximately 20 percent of the
$13.6 billion aimed at drug prevention enforcement was directed at cannabis
prohibition.).
97. See FED. BUREAU INVESTIGATION, CRIME IN THE UNITED STATES 2012:
PERSONS ARRESTED (2013), available at http://www.fbi.gov/about-
us/cjis/ucr/crime-in-the-u.s/2012/crime-in-the-u.s.-2012/persons-arrested/per-
sons-arrested (finding that in 2012, an estimated 48 percent of all people ar-
rested for drug abuse were arrested for marijuana sale and possession, with a
majority of those, 42.4 percent, for possession). In total, there were 749,824
marijuana arrests, more than all violent crime arrests combined. Id.
98. GALSTON, supra note 95, at 15–16.
2015] INTERNATIONAL CANNABIS REGULATION 663
from women and Latinos, who historically opposed legaliza-
tion.99 However, a majority of both of these groups voted in favor
of the referenda as a result of carefully chosen advertisements
that highlighted how these initiatives would prevent drug access
to youth, generate funds to benefit schools, and positively impact
civil rights by lessening the discriminatory nature of drug
laws.100
On November 6, 2012, ballot initiatives in both Colorado and
Washington legalized cannabis by a vote of 54 and 55 percent,
respectively.101 Colorado’s Amendment 64, The Regulate Mariju-
ana Like Alcohol Act of 2012, authorizes unlicensed legal pro-
duction of up to six cannabis plants for personal use and non-
commercial transactions of up to one ounce.102 Recreational can-
nabis shops must obtain government licenses and conform to
packaging requirements that specify potency and chemicals
used, security specifications, testing requirements, and public
safety measures.103 City governments are allowed to develop fur-
ther regulations or ban the operation of retail stores.104 Colorado
residents with valid state identification are permitted to buy one
ounce at a time, while tourists may buy up to a quarter ounce.105
In November, 2013, a later referendum approved a combined 25
percent excise and sales tax.106 The first $40 million USD of gen-
erated revenue will be used for construction of schools, regula-
99. Casey Michel, The Secret Ingredients for Marijuana Legalization: Moms
and Hispanics, ATLANTIC (Nov. 19, 2012, 2:05 PM), http://www.theatlan-
tic.com/politics/archive/2012/11/the-secret-ingredients-for-marijuana-legaliza-
tion-moms-and-hispanics/265369/.
100. Id.
101. Jack Healy, Voters Ease Marijuana Laws in 2 States, but Legal Ques-
tions Remain, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 8, 2012, http://www.ny-
times.com/2012/11/08/us/politics/marijuana-laws-eased-in-colorado-and-wash-
ington.html?_r=0.
102. COLO. CONST. art. XVIII, § 16(3).
103. See generally COLO. CODEREGS. § 212-2 (2013).
104. John Ingold, A Colorado Marijuana Guide: 64 Answers to Commonly
Asked Questions, DENVER POST (Dec. 31, 2013, 12:30 PM), http://www.den-
verpost.com/marijuana/ci_24823785/colorado-marijuana-guide-64-answers-
commonly-asked-questions.
105. Id.
106. Matt Ferner. Colorado Recreational Marijuana Sales Exceed $5 Million
in First Week, HUFFINGTON POST (Jan. 8, 2014, 7:37 AM), http://www.huffing-
tonpost.com/2014/01/08/marijuana-sales-colorado_n_4552371.html.
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tion of cannabis stores, and dissemination of educational mate-
rial discussing the negative impact of cannabis.107 Cannabis re-
mains unlawful for those under the age of twenty-one, those
smoking in open and public spaces,108 and those driving with
more than five nanograms or milliliters of THC in their blood.109
Washington’s Initiative 502 legalized possession of up to one
ounce of cannabis, sixteen ounces in solid form, or seventy-two
ounces of cannabis in liquid form, to be consumed within the
state’s boundaries.110 Unlike Colorado, cannabis must be pur-
chased from a state licensed retailer and cannot be grown for
recreational use or sale.111 TheWashington State Liquor Control
Board has authority to promulgate regulations and issue sepa-
rate licenses for retailers and producers, including setting an ex-
act amount of cannabis that can be grown in each location.112
Currently, the board has only allocated two million square feet
for cannabis cultivation and a maximum of 334 retail stores
statewide, but the demand for stores has far exceeded that
amount.113 Current rules are in place to protect public safety,
such as making driving under the influence illegal and prevent-
ing access to minors under the age of twenty-one.114 In order to
generate tax revenue, Washington implemented a higher tax
rate than Colorado.115
107. Ingold, supra note 104, at 5.
108. Id. at 1.
109. John Ingold, Colorado Legislature Gives Final OK to Marijuana Driving
Limit, DENVER POST (May 7, 2013, 10:11 AM), http://www.den-
verpost.com/ci_23189484/colorado-legislature-gives-final-ok-marijuana-driv-
ing-limit.
110. Joel Millman,Washington State Sets Pot Sales Rules: Strict Regulations
on Recreational Market, WALL STREET JOURNAL (Oct. 16, 2013, 6:22 PM),
http://www.wsj.com/arti-
cles/SB10001424052702304384104579139831698306604.
111. FAQs on I-502, WASHINGTON STATE LIQUOR CONTROL BOARD (2015),
http://liq.wa.gov/marijuana/faqs_i-502.
112. Id. at 2.
113. Millman, supra note, at 110; Gene Johnson, State Faces Prospect of Too
Many Pot Growers, HUFFINGTON POST (Jan 7, 2014, 2:07 PM), http://seat-
tle.cbslocal.com/2014/01/07/state-faces-prospect-of-too-many-pot-growers/.
114. WASHINGTON STATE LIQUORCONTROL BOARD, supra note, at 111.
115. John Walsh, Q&A: Legal Marijuana in Colorado and Washington,
BROOKINGS (May 21, 2013), http://www.brookings.edu/research/pa-
pers/2013/05/21-legal-marijuana-colorado-washington.
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While the state initiatives are contrary to international and
federal laws,116 Attorney General Eric Holder announced on Au-
gust 29, 2013, that the federal government would not interfere
with state governments’ implementation of these ballot initia-
tives, as long as they prevent sales to minors, distribution to
states that still criminalize cannabis, profit by criminal groups,
or prove to be a significant detriment to public health.117 The
Senate Judiciary Committee reiterated this stance and acknowl-
edged the negative consequences of the war on drugs during a
congressional hearing on September 10, 2013.118 Colorado Rep-
resentative Jared Police introduced a bill still pending before
Congress entitled Ending Federal Cannabis Prohibition Act that
would remove cannabis from the Controlled Substance Act.119
These statements and actions from political leaders show
promise that the federal government will not preempt the state
initiatives, but the judicial branch and the Drug Enforcement
Agency (“DEA”) could still prevent state action. The Supreme
Court has previously allowed federal oversight of California me-
dicinal dispensaries, granted Congress authority to prohibit lo-
cal cultivation and use of cannabis that is compliant with state
law,120 and prevented the reclassification of cannabis.121 In order
116. Cannabis is regulated as a Schedule I substance under the CSA in order
to “enable the United States to meet all of its obligations under international
treaties.” 21 USC §§ 801(7), 801a(2)-(3) (2007). The state statutes violate inter-
national law because the treaties are binding on them as well due to the Su-
premacy Clause in the Constitution. U.S. CONST., art. VI, cl. 2. International
treaties have been interpreted by the Supreme Court as binding on local and
state governments. In Asakura v. Seattle, the court found that a city ordinance
that violated an international treaty was unconstitutional because the treaty
applied even to local governments. Asakura v. Seattle, 265 U.S. 335 (1922).
117. MEMORANDUM, supra note 8.
118. Conflicts Between State and Federal Marijuana Laws: Hearing Before S.
Comm. on the Judiciary, 113th Cong. 7 (2013) (statement of John Urquhart,
Sheriff).
119. H.R. 499, 113th Cong. (2013).
120. See Bender, supra note 94, 376–78. In 2001, the Supreme Court, in
United States v. Oakland Cannabis Buyers’ Coop, stated that the federal gov-
ernment could act because the Controlled Substance Act failed to provide an
exception for the medical necessity. In 2005, Gonzales v. Raich, established
that local cultivation could be banned because of the impact on interstate com-
merce and the national economy.
121. The federal appeals court in American For Safe Access v. DEA in 2013
upheld the DEA’s rejected of a petition to reclassify marijuana from its current
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to comply with international obligations, the DEA continues to
raid medicinal dispensaries despite the Obama administration’s
repeated requests that it end this practice.122
B. Uruguay
In June, 2012, President Jose Mujica of Uruguay proposed a
bill to legalize and regulate cannabis use, after a report from the
Defense Ministry recommended this as one way to tackle the ris-
ing level of crime.123 Violence is seen as a relatively new phenom-
enon in Uruguay that began in 2001 as a result of international
cartels using the nation to produce, sell, and traffic drugs.124
Even though Uruguay still remains one of the safest countries
in the world, Uruguayans have an exaggerated sense of their
level of domestic insecurity.125 Another development that led to
this bill’s creation is a significant increase in the use of cannabis
in Uruguay during this same period.126
This new law is also an attempt to close a loophole created by
a 1974 law, which allowed cannabis for personal use, but prohib-
ited the sale or production of it.127 The earlier provision proved
federal status as a dangerous drug with no accepted medical use. The U.S. Su-
preme Court failed to grant a certification. Paul Armentano, US Supreme
Court Refuses to Review DEA’s Denial Of Petition That Sought to Reclassify
Cannabis, NORML (Oct. 8, 2013), http://blog.norml.org/2013/10/08/us-su-
preme-court-refuses-to-review-deas-denial-of-petition-that-sought-to-reclas-
sify-cannabis. A U.S. district court upheld the constitutionality of the CSA’s
classification of marijuana, in part due to the necessity to satisfy international
treaty obligations. United States v. LaFrosica, 854 F. Supp. 1338, 1341
(S.D.N.Y. 1973).
122. See Bender, supra note 94, 378–79.
123. Weed All About It, ECONOMIST (Dec. 11, 2013, 3:36 PM), http://www.econ-
omist.com/blogs/americasview/2013/12/uruguays-cannabis-law.
124. GEOFFREY RAMSEY, INSIGHT CRIME, URUGUAY: MARIJUANA, ORGANIZED
CRIME AND THE POLITICS OF DRUGS 13–15 (July 2013) [hereinafter INSIGHT
CRIME].
125. RAMSEY, supra note 124, at 13–14. Even though the country has one of
the lowest rates of violent crime and murder globally with 6 per 100,000 hab-
itants, a survey conducted by Corporacion Latinobarometro found that Uru-
guay has one of the largest gaps of the level of perceived insecurity and the
rate of actual violence. In May, 2012, 40 percent of the population felt that the
main problem facing the country was security and 84 percent felt that crime
had worsened in the past two months.
126. U.N. OFFICE ON DRUGS AND CRIME, WORLD DRUG REPORT 2013, at 13,
U.N. Sales No. E.13.XI.6 (2013).
127. Rosmarin & Eastwood, supra note 2, at 35.
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problematic because police continuously arrested and detained
users under the de facto presumption that they were engaged in
the cultivation or trafficking, rather than mere possession of,
cannabis.128 The updated law’s main purpose is to use economic
resources and government personnel more efficiently in order to
combat trafficking of all drugs, including cannabis.129
On December 10, 2013, the Uruguayan senate, by a vote of six-
teen to thirteen, passed a detailed bill,130 of which 66 percent of
Uruguayans disapprove.131 The law allows individuals to grow
up to six plants, to buy up to forty grams monthly from state
pharmacies, and to join membership clubs of fifteen to forty-five
people each that may collectively grow up to ninety-nine
plants.132 The considerable regulation of cannabis, such as con-
trolling the amount of THC to ensure the drug’s quality133 and
setting a standard national price, serves to compete with, and
suppress, the black market.134 In order to prevent drug tourism,
only Uruguayan citizens over eighteen are able to purchase can-
nabis.135 The bill promotes public health by mandating educa-
tional campaigns on drug consumption for school children,136
segregating the cannabis market from the market for more
harmful drugs, and using the generated tax revenue to develop
programs focused on helping people with drug problems.137
128. Id.
129. RAMSEY, supra note 124, at 7. Jose Mujica stated in an interview that “it
is not beautiful to legalize marijuana, but it is worse to give people to the drug
traffickers.”No Es Bonito Legalizar La Marihuana Pero Peor Es Regalar Gente
Al Narco, LA NACION (Dec. 11, 2013), http://www.lanacion.com.ar/1646473-
jose-mujica-no-es-bonito-legalizar-la-marihuana-pero-peor-es-regalar-gente-
al-narco.
130. Simon Romero, Uruguay Acts to Legalize Marijuana, N.Y. TIMES, Dec.
10, 2013, http://www.nytimes.com/2013/12/11/world/americas/uruguay-acts-
to-legalize-marijuana.html.
131. Uruguay: 66% Se Opone A Legalizacion De Marihuana, EL SIGLO, (Dec.
29, 2013, 8:27 AM), http://www.elsiglodedurango.com.mx/noticia/483167.uru-
guay-66-se-opone-a-legalizacion-de-marihuana.html.
132. Article 5. Proyecto Ley 19.172. [Uru.].
133. Id.; RAMSEY, supra note 124, at 10.
134. Uki Goni, Uruguay Sets Price of Legalised Cannabis at $1 a Gram,
GUARDIAN (Oct. 22, 2013, 1:19 PM), http://www.theguard-
ian.com/world/2013/oct/22/uruguay-legal-cannabis-1-dollar-gram.
135. Romero, supra note 130, at 2; Article 14. Proyecto Ley N708/13. [Uru.].
136. Article 10. Proyecto Ley N708/13. [Uru.]; Jose Mujica, President of Uru-
guay, Remarks at the General Assembly (Aug. 8, 2012).
137. Mujica, supra note 129.
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Colorado, Washington, and Uruguay have allowed for a regu-
lated cannabis market by legalizing the drug’s production, sale,
and use. However, there are key differences in the justifications
provided for, and the implementation of, the laws that reflect
cultural and economic disparities. For example, retail stores are
private in the United States, but are operated by the government
in Uruguay.138 These variant models were chosen because Uru-
guayans, unlike Americans, are less suspicious of government
interference in their lives and more accustomed to state-run en-
terprises.139 Another major difference is that Uruguay’s primary
motive to pass the bill was to weaken the drug cartels, a reason
frequently highlighted by other Latin American countries.140 In
contrast, the United States has wanted to generate revenue and
save government resources, which is a reason that some Euro-
pean cities have also mentioned in their attempts to legalize can-
nabis.141 In the future, these isolated bills, with important ideo-
logical distinctions, will likely become models for change in sim-
ilarly oriented nations attempting to regulate cannabis.142
III. CHANGING CURRENT INTERNATIONALDRUG TREATIES TO
ALLOWDOMESTIC CHANGE IN THE REGULATION OF CANNABIS
PROVES UNWORKABLE
The laws in Colorado, Uruguay, and Washington that create a
regulatory market for cannabis clearly breach obligations under
the Single Convention and 1988 Convention. There is no liberal
interpretation that could reconcile these new laws within the
confines of the existing conventions. As a result, a change is
needed in the convention or in the respective countries’ obliga-
tions under the conventions. For instance, the states could alter
their international obligations by placing a reservation on the
specific portions concerning cannabis, or by withdrawing from
138. TRANSNATIONAL INSTITUTE, LATIN AMERICADRUG POLICYDIALOGUE 2013
MALDONADO (URUGUAY) 12 (Apr. 2013).
139. Id.
140. RAMSEY, supra note 124, at 13.
141. In Rasquera, Spain, the mayor developed an anti-crisis plan in order to
relieve the town from public debt by allowing a public company to provide can-
nabis to adults legally. TRANSNATIONAL INSTITUTE, supra note 138, at 10.
142. In 2014, voters in Oregon and Alaska approved cannabis legislation bal-
lot initiatives similar to Washington and Colorado. Dan Merica, Oregon,
Alaska and Washington, D.C. Legalize Marijuana, CNN (Nov. 5, 2014, 2:39
PM), http://www.cnn.com/2014/11/04/politics/marijuana-2014/.
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the treaty altogether. Another option would be to change the lan-
guage of the treaties for all signatories by removal of cannabis
from the conventions’ schedules or formal amendment. This sec-
tion will explore the various options that would ease restrictions
currently governing cannabis, but would otherwise maintain in-
ternational compliance with the other requirements of the trea-
ties.
A. Denunciation
Signatories could attempt to unilaterally exit from both of the
conventions. In order to initiate the process, the Member States
would need to provide written notification to the Secretary-Gen-
eral.143 The withdrawal would become effective for the Single
Convention after the following first day of January, provided
that the denunciation is received at least six months prior;144
and for the 1988 Convention, one year after the Secretary-Gen-
eral receives the denunciation.145 While the departing state does
not need to explain or get consent from other states, exiting with
no formal justification could damage a state’s international rep-
utation.146 For this reason, most signatories justify such an ac-
tion by proving that the treaty was based on a factual error147 or
that, since ratification, there has been a significant change in
circumstances.148
143. Single Convention, supra note 12, art. 46; 1988 Convention, supra note
13, art. 30.
144. Single Convention, supra note 12, art. 46.
145. 1988 Convention, supra note 12, art. 30.
146. Laurence R. Helfer, Exiting Treaties, 91 VA. L. REV. 1579, 1582, 1621–
26 (2005) [hereinafter Exiting].
147. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 48, May 23, 1969, 1155
U.N.T.S. 331 (entered into force Jan. 27, 1980) [hereinafter Vienna Conven-
tion].
148. Id. art. 62. Article 62(1) provides:
A fundamental change of circumstances which has occurred with re-
gard to those existing at the time of the conclusion of a treaty, and
which was not foreseen by the parties, may not be invoked as a ground
for terminating or withdrawing from the treaty unless: (a) the exist-
ence of those circumstances constituted an essential basis of the con-
sent of the parties to be bound by the treaty; and (b) the effect of the
change is radically to transform the extent of obligations still to be
performed under the treaty.
Id.
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In order to prove that an error in reasoning was the basis of
strict classification of cannabis in these conventions, signatories
could prove that the drafters incorrectly concluded at the time of
ratification that cannabis was a dangerous, addictive substance
with no beneficial medical value.149 Alternatively, if signatories
concede that the harsh scheduling of cannabis was initially jus-
tified, there is now ample evidence to prove the medical utility
of the plant,150 which could provide for significantly changed cir-
cumstances. Advocates of cannabis prohibition could state that
these grounds justify cannabis use solely for medical reasons,
something already allowed by the convention.151 Another argu-
ment for blanket misclassification of cannabis is that the drug
arguably poses fewer health risks than alcohol or tobacco,152 two
149. The 1952WHOExpert Committee on Drugs Liable to Produce Addiction
made an unsubstantiated declaration that the use of cannabis had no medical
justification, which was eventually used as the basis to place cannabis under
the strictest control regime. KITTIL BRUUN, ET AL., THE GENTLEMEN’S CLUB:
INTERNATIONAL CONTROL OF DRUGS AND ALCOHOL 196 (1975). This opinion vir-
tually ignored other scientific reports, which unequivocally stated that canna-
bis is not medically harmful. (“Already in 1944, The La Guardia Committee
Report onMarihuana conducted in New York City that stated that ‘the practice
of smoking marihuana does not lead to addiction in the medical sense of the
word’ and that ‘the use of marihuana does not lead to morphine or heroin or
cocaine addiction.’ In 1968 the Wootton Report stated that ‘the dangers of can-
nabis use as commonly accepted in the past and the risk of progression to opi-
ates have been overstated’ and ‘cannabis is less harmful than other substances
amphetamines, barbiturates, codeine-like compound.’”) Bollotta, supra note
22, at 107.
150. Marijuana is a useful treatment for glaucoma, nausea in chemotherapy
patients, asthma, and multiple sclerosis pain. For studies on medicinal bene-
fits, see NAT’L RES. COUNCIL, NAT’L ACADEMY OF SCI., AN ANALYSIS OF
MARIJUANA POLICY (1982) (advocating for a reconsideration of cannabis as a
result of its use for possible medical treatment for glaucoma and asthma pa-
tients); J. JOY ET AL., NAT’L INST. OFMEDICINE RES., MARIJUANA ANDMEDICINE:
ASSESSING THE SCIENCE BASE (1999) (finding that marijuana was effective for
nausea and severe weight loss for AIDS and cancer patients).
151. Single Convention, supra note 12, art. 4(c).
152. In August 1995, WHO released a report, which concluded “on existing
patterns of use, cannabis poses a much less serious public health problem than
is currently posed by alcohol and tobacco in Western societies.”Martin Jelsma,
Drugs in the U.N. System: The Unwritten History of the 1998 United Nations
General Assembly Special Session on Drugs, 14 INT’L J. DRUG POL’Y 181, 190
(2003). A Canadian report concluded that the “health costs for alcohol and to-
bacco are much higher than for cannabis. This may indicate that cannabis use
involves fewer health risks than alcohol or tobacco.” Gerald Thomas & Chris
Davis, Cannabis, Tobacco and Alcohol Use in Canada, 5 VISIONS J. 5, 11 (2009).
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legal substances outside of these treaties’ control. A final reason
for determining an error is that cannabis is no longer considered
a gateway to more harmful drug use.153 Therefore, the particu-
larly stringent restrictions on cannabis use are not proportion-
ate to the dangers involved.
Alternatively, the Member States could prove a fundamental
change in circumstances, either independently or in connection
with the error. In order for such a change to be validly invoked,
the underlying circumstances essential to the parties’ consent to
the treaty must have subsequently changed, the change must
have been unforeseeable and no fault of the invoking party, and
the change’s effect must have been so significant as to transform
the future performance of the treaty obligations.154 This reason-
ing applies for three reasons: the dramatic shift in cannabis us-
age from isolated usage by minorities to widespread use,155 the
increased reliable, scientific data concerning cannabis’ medical
benefits,156 and the resultant unintended consequences of the
153. Pablo Osvaldo Wolff, the head of the Addiction Producing Drug Section
of theWHO from 1949-1955 stated in a report entitled the Physical andMental
Effects of Cannabis that “not only is marihuana smoking per se a danger but
that its use eventually leads he smoker to turn to intravenous heroin injec-
tions.” This reasoning might also provide justification that cannabis was seen
as not being as dangerous as other drugs under the strictest control but was
rather was seen as a gateway drug to more harmful substances. Bruun, supra
note 149, at 198–99. Recently, the Institute of Medicine in the United States
found that there is little persuasive evidence that the pharmacological proper-
ties of cannabis can provoke the switch to hard drugs. THEDUTCHMINISTRY OF
FOREIGNAFFAIRS, FAQDRUGS: AGUIDETODUTCHPOLICY1, 7 (2008). A research
study concluded that it’s the users’ personalities and opportunities that deter-
mine the risk of using harder drugs rather than the drug’s contents. ANDREW
R. MORRAL, ET AL., RAND DRUG POLICY RESEARCH CENTER, USING MARIJUANA
MAYNOT RAISE THE RISK OFUSINGDRUGS (2002).
154. Vienna Convention, supra note 147, art. 62(1); but see Oliver J.
Lissitzyn, Treaties and Changed Circumstances (Rebus Sic Stantibus), 61 AM.
J. INT’L L. 895, 912 (1967) (“A change in circumstances may be invoked even if
it was not “unforeseen’ in the absolute sense. The parties may have been aware
of the possibility of the change but for various reasons failed to provide for it
expressly.”); Id. at 915 (‘“Foreseeing’ a future event may mean expecting it as
inevitable, expecting it as probable, or thinking of it as possible but not
likely.”).
155. See generally Part I.A & I.C for details on how cannabis became used by
more mainstream society by the 1970 and 1980s.
156. See footnote 150 for studies showing the medical usefulness of cannabis.
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prohibitionist theory underlying the treaties.157 The United
States and Uruguay could successfully argue that these changes
radically transform their obligations and undermine the prem-
ises that were essential to their ratification.158
However, withdrawal may not terminate the states’ treaty ob-
ligations, if supporters of cannabis prohibition successfully ar-
gue that the obligation to prevent cannabis legalization is part
of customary international law under Article 38 of the Vienna
Convention on the Law of Treaties (“Vienna Convention.”)159 Ad-
vocates of this point of view would need to prove that there is a
consistent, general practice of cannabis prohibition that is re-
quired by law.160 If successfully argued, the withdrawn states
would still be bound by the treaty obligations, even though no
longer signatories.161 However, given the increasingly lenient
treatment of cannabis globally, the number of countries who
want to pass similar legislation, and the recent proposal to end
prohibition,162 such a position is not likely to be substantiated.
This approach, however, is likely to fail, even though denunci-
ation appears feasible. Withdrawal is a drastic measure that
157. Some examples of these unintended consequences include: (1) the
growth of a huge criminal black market in order to meet the drug’s demand,
(2) extensive policy displacement where resources focused on police at the ex-
pense of funding public health initiatives, (3) geographical displacement where
drug become produced in less regulated areas, and (4) the stigmatization, mar-
ginalization, and exclusion of drug users. Fit for Purpose, supra note 20, at 10–
11. Cannabis legalization in the United States had the opposite effect and has
led to a 32% drop in the drug’s confiscation at the U.S.-Mexican border in 2014.
Ioan Grillo, U.S. Legalization of Marijuana has Hit Mexican Cartels’ Cross-
Border Trade, TIME (Apr. 8, 2015), http://time.com/3801889/us-legalization-
marijuana-trade/.
158. This argument is more difficult for the United States due to their instru-
mental role in the adoption of the prohibitionist framework and the strict reg-
ulation for cannabis.
159. Vienna Convention, supra note 147, art. 38.
160. Michael Byers, Custom, Power and the Power of Rules Customary Inter-
national Law From An Interdisciplinary Perspective, 17 MICH. J. INT’L. L. 109,
136 (1995).
161. Id.
162. A draft of a U.N. paper set to be released in the spring of 2014 showed
that a growing group of Latin American and European countries desire a pub-
lic-health approach to be adopted in place of the current prohibition approach.
Jamie Doward, Leaked Paper Reveals U.N. Split over War on Drugs, GUARDIAN
(Nov. 30, 2013, 2:50 PM), http://www.theguardian.com/poli-
tics/2013/nov/30/un-drugs-policy-split-leaked-paper.
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would absolve withdrawing parties from all the treaty’s obliga-
tions. The drug conventions remain almost universally adhered
to163 and states would hesitate to retreat on their commitments,
out of fear of diplomatic backlash.164 Moreover, the purpose of
the legalization initiatives is to provide a regulated, licit canna-
bis trade, rather than allow the growth of the black market.165
The states are only liberalizing their prohibitionist approach to
cannabis and are unlikely to completely sever ties with the drug
conventions’ stance for other drugs. As a result, states would be
reluctant to use this option.
B. Re-accession with a Reservation
After the denunciation takes effect, states could re-accede to
the treaties with a reservation to the scheduling of cannabis.166
This process differs slightly depending on the treaty. The Single
Convention contains specific provisions controlling the reserva-
tion process, whereas the 1988 Convention has no specification,
and is thus governed by the Vienna Convention.167
1. The Single Convention
For the Single Convention, a reservation is allowed, so long as
the parties notify the U.N. Secretary-General and no more than
one-third of the signatories object to the reservation within a
year.168 After a year, the reserving parties could re-accede, pro-
163. There are 186 signatories to the Single Convention and 182 to the 1988
convention. Fit for Purpose, supra note 20, at 3.
164. Exiting, supra note 146, at 1590–91.
165. Charlie Devereux & Lucia Baldamir, Uruguay Vote May Augur First
State-Regulated Cannabis Market, BLOOMBERG (DEC. 10, 2013, 8:13 AM),
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2013-12-10/uruguay-vote-may-set-
up-first-state-regulated-marijuana-market.
166. Vienna Convention, supra note 148, art. 2(1)(a). “A reservation is a uni-
lateral statement by party when signing, ratifying, accepting, approving or ac-
ceding to a treaty whereby its purports to modify or exclude the effect of certain
legal provisions as applied to their state. Even though reservations to a treaty
used to be made when initially ratifying a treaty, late reservations are increas-
ingly being used.” Laurence R. Helfer, Not Fully Committed? Reservations,
Risk and Treaty Design, 31 YALE J. INT’L L. 367, 382 (2006).
167. ROBIN ROOM ET AL., ROADMAPS TO REFORMING THE U.N. DRUG
CONVENTION 15 (2012). [hereinafter ROOM – ROADMAPS].
168. Single Convention, supra note 12, art. 50(3).
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vided that less than one-third of the parties object to the re-ac-
cession.169 As more countries are beginning to relax their stance
on cannabis, a reservation could be successful.
Further support for this action’s viability is gained from Bo-
livia’s successful challenge to the Single Convention’s classifica-
tion of the coca leaf.170 Bolivia argued that the Single Conven-
tion’s restriction of the coca leaf violates the Bolivian constitu-
tion by denying the right of the indigenous population to use the
leaf for traditional purposes.171 As a result, the Bolivian govern-
ment formally withdrew from the Single Convention172 and re-
acceded to the Convention, with a reservation against the ban
on the coca leaf and its traditional uses on January 11, 2013.173
Despite criticism from the INCB,174 the reservation was allowed
169. Room, supra note 6, at 157.
170. Jamie Doward, Bolivians Demand the Right to Chew Coca Leaves,
GUARDIAN (Jan. 12, 2013, 7:06 PM), http://www.theguard-
ian.com/world/2013/jan/13/bolivia-drugs-row-chew-coca.
171. INTERNATIONAL DRUG POLICY CONSORTIUM, BOLIVIA’S LEGAL
RECONCILIATION WITH THE U.N. SINGLE CONVENTION ON NARCOTIC DRUGS 1, 2
(2011), available at http://www.undrugcontrol.info/en/issues/unscheduling-
the-coca-leaf/item/2628-bolivias-legal-reconciliation-with-the-un-single-con-
vention-on-narcotic-drugs.
The state protects the original and ancestral use of coca as cultural
patrimony, a renewable natural resource of the biodiversity of Bolivia,
and as a factor of social cohesion; in its natural state it is not a nar-
cotic. The revaluing, production, commercialization, and industriali-
zation shall be regulated by law.
Constitucion de 2009 [Constitution of 2009], July 5, 2011, art. 384 (Bol.).
172. Bolivia: Denunciation of the Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs, 1961,
C.N.421.2011.TREATIES-28 (June 30, 2011).
173. Press Release, U.N. Office on Drugs and Crime, Bolivia to Re-accede to
U.N. Drug Convention, while Marking Exception on Coca Leaf Chewing, avail-
able at https://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/frontpage/2013/January/bolivia-to-re-
accede-to-un-drug-convention-while-making-exception-on-coca-leaf-chew-
ing.html (last visited Mar. 15, 2015).
174. Press Release, International Narcotics Control Board, International
Narcotics Control Board Regrets Bolivia’s Denunciation of the Single Conven-
tion on Narcotic Drugs, UNIS/NAR/1114 (July 5, 2011) (“The Board is of the
opinion that while this step by Bolivia may be in line with the letter of the
Convention, such action is contrary to the Convention’s spirit” as it “would un-
dermine the integrity of the global drug control system, undoing the good work
of the Governments over many years to achieve the aims and objectives of the
drug control conventions, including the prevention of drug abuse which is dev-
astating the lives of millions of people.”).
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because only fifteen countries objected to Bolivia’s reserva-
tion.175Bolivia’s successful challenge illustrates how other states
can propose a similar challenge concerning cannabis regulation
in order to allow for the legalization of its use in the domestic
sphere to comply with international law.
2. The 1988 Convention
According to the 1988 Convention, a party may make a reser-
vation at any time, so long as the reservation is compatible with
the treaty’s “object and purpose.”176 This raises the question of
whether cannabis legalization statutes are incompatible with
the convention’s object and purpose. Unfortunately, this is a sub-
jective determination, since neither the Vienna Convention nor
other treaties provide any guidance about the meaning of this
phrase.177 On the one hand, a state could justify a reservation
concerning cannabis, reasoning that the liberalization of canna-
bis promotes the “health and welfare of mankind” and prevents
illicit drug trafficking178 by allowing for a controlled market. On
the other hand, the reservation could be irreconcilable with the
treaty because it repeatedly advances a prohibitionist view and
specifies that the production of cannabis should be limited to me-
dicinal and scientific purposes.
175. United States of America: Objection to the Reservation Contained in the
Communication by the Plurinational State of Bolivia, C.N.361.2012.TREATIES-
VI.18 (July 3, 2012); United Kingdom: Objection to the Reservation Contained
in The Communication By The Plurinational State of Bolivia,
C.N.719.2012.TREATIES-VI.18 (Dec. 14, 2102); Sweden: Objection to the Reser-
vation Contained in the Communication By The Plurinational State of Bolivia
C.N.732.2012.TREATIES-VI.18 (Dec. 21, 2012); Italy: Objection To The Reserva-
tion Contained In the Communication By the Plurinational State of Bolivia
C.N.750.2012. REATIES-VI.18 (Dec. 28, 2012); Canada: Objection to the Reser-
vation Contained In the Communication By the Plurinational State of Bolivia
C.N.751.2102.TREATIES-VI.18 (Dec. 28, 2012); France: Objection to the Reser-
vation Contained In the Communication By The Plurinational State of Bolivia
C.N.19.2013.TREATIES-VI.18 (Jan. 3, 2013); Germany: Objection To The Reser-
vation Contained In The Communication By The Plurinational State of Bolivia
C.N.57.2013.TREATIES-VI.18 (Jan. 4, 2013); Mexico: Objection To The Reserva-
tion Contained In The Communication By The Plurinational State of Bolivia
C.N.85.2013.TREATIES-VI.18 (Jan. 9, 2013).
176. Vienna Convention, supra note 147, art. 19(c).
177. Edward T. Swaine, Reserving, 31 YALE J. OF INT’L L. 307, 315 (2006).
178. Single Convention, supra note 12, preamble.
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Normally, a reservation does not need to be formally accepted
in order to take effect.179 However, in order for the modification
to apply to other countries, non-reserving states would need to
formally accept or fail to reject the reservation within one
year.180 In a limited number of circumstances, when the ratifica-
tion of the entire treaty by all signatories is essential to the ob-
ject and purpose, all signatories must accept the reservation.181
Complete acceptance does not seem to be a requirement, since
twenty-three Member States have previously made successful
reservations to the 1988 Convention.182
3. Reservation as a Temporary Solution
The reservation process allows specific states to revise their
treaty commitments unilaterally in response to the conflicting
domestic legislation and according to its precise wishes.183 The
benefit of this approach compared to complete denunciation is
that the reserving party remains committed to all of the conven-
tions’ provisions except those directly concerning cannabis.184
Unilateral action may compel other countries that have decrim-
inalization and depenalization statutes to lodge the same or sim-
ilar reservations concerning the classification on cannabis. Res-
ervations will increase the costs on compliant nations who re-
main committed to prohibiting cannabis, since the legalization
provisions will have a global impact and make prohibiting can-
nabis harder in other states.185 Thus, mass reservations could
drive modification of the treaties’ provisions toward cannabis ei-
ther through formal amendment or renegotiation.186
One fear for the reserving party is that other countries would
retaliate by placing economic sanctions as a punishment for the
reservation on cannabis.187 For example, in response to Bolivia’s
179. Vienna Convention, supra note 147, art. 20.
180. Id. art. 21(3). See also Swaine, supra note 177, at 316 (noting that non-
reserving states and treaty monitoring bodies could implicitly imply reserva-
tion by stating that the reservation was incompatible with the remaining por-
tions of the treaty or with other treaties and thus unnecessary).
181. Vienna Convention, supra note 147, art. 20(3).
182. ROOM – ROADMAPS, supra note 166, at 20.
183. Helfer, supra note 165, at 373.
184. See id. at 375.
185. Exiting, supra note 146, at 1646; Helfer, supra note 165, at 371.
186. Exiting, supra note 146, at 1646; Helfer, supra note 165, at 371.
187. ROOM – ROADMAPS, supra note 166, at 24.
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actions, the European Commission investigated whether the de-
nunciation justified a withdrawal of economic aid to Bolivia,188
but ultimately concluded that the denunciation did not warrant
such action.189 Likewise, western countries would be hesitant to
enact embargos for two main reasons: the fear that signatory
states would withdraw from the conventions entirely, or the
recognition that their own domestic legislation and policies con-
cerning cannabis are contrary to the conventions as well.190
While the international drug regulatory bodies have urged the
United States and Uruguay to comply with international drug
control treaties, they have failed to insinuate any possible reper-
cussions for failure to comply. Therefore, sanctions are unlikely
to be imposed, even if they remain a fear for states considering
a reservation.
Another reason to not place a reservation is that the reserving
states will no longer participate in international regulation of
cannabis, which seems contrary to the aim of the new legisla-
tion.191 As a result, this provides only a temporary remedy in or-
der to regulate the treatment of cannabis under international
law.
C. Changing the Status of Cannabis
The Single Convention currently classifies cannabis as one of
the most dangerous narcotics subject to regulation.192 At an in-
ternational level, cannabis can be deleted from the Single Con-
vention entirely or moved to a lower schedule in order to allow
domestic legalization to comply with international law.193 Most
signatory states model their scheduling decisions on the U.N.’s
determinations, so the U.N.’s failure to reclassify cannabis
188. Commission Decision 2012/161, 2012 O.J. (L 80/30).
189. Commission Decision 2013/136, 2013 O.J. (L 75/35).
190. Reservations, supra note 165, at 372. Noting that countries are less
likely to object to reservations when they secretly want to change their own
treaty commitments and that commitment to part of the treaty is a preferable
alternative. Id.
191. La Nacion, supra note 130.
192. See supra Part 1. Cannabis is listed in Schedule I and Schedule VI sub-
stance, which mandates that all regulative control articles apply in the Single
Convention. The 1988 Convention does not schedule drugs.
193. BRUNN, supra note 149, at 47.
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serves as an impediment for domestic legalization.194 Unfortu-
nately, according to Article 3(6) cannabis can only be transferred
to Schedule II or removed from the Convention.195 Rescheduling
fails to provide a viable solution, since Schedule II still prohibits
the cultivation, production, and sale of drugs.196 Therefore,
descheduling is the only option.
Descheduling cannabis begins with a Member State justifying
to the U.N. Secretary-General why cannabis is incorrectly sched-
uled.197 Next, the World Health Organization (“WHO”) Expert
Committee would need to issue a recommendation to CND as to
whether cannabis should be removed from the schedule based
on the extent of the drug’s effects in comparison to other
drugs.198 In making this determination, the WHO has “wide dis-
cretion” in formulating its final decision, but should be guided
by public health concerns, including “the degree of danger which
the substance in question presents[,] but also from the need to
make useful medicines as easily available as may be compatible
with the requirements of their control.”199 Next, the CND would
vote by simple majority, as to whether, based on the WHO’s rec-
ommendation, cannabis should be deleted from the schedule. 200
194. In the United States, congress enacted Controlled Substances Act in
1970 for dual purpose (1) to control and regulate the licit and illicit trade in
and use of such substances and (2) to implement the U.S. obligations under the
Single Convention. 21 U.S.C. § 801a.
195. Single Convention, supra note 12, art 3(6).
196. Id. art. 2(2). Schedule II substances are subject to the same measures of
control as Schedule I substances except for articles 30(2) and (5) which deal
with labeling and business transactions respectively. Therefore, the cultiva-
tion, production, and sale of drugs would still be illegal under international
law according to Article 36.
197. Id. art. 3(1).
198. Id. art. (3)(iii). There are two stages to the WHO process. Stage one re-
quires WHO to find cannabis is in fact not a) liable to similar abuse and pro-
ductive of similar ill effects as the drugs in Schedule I or Schedule II, or b)
convertible into such drug. The original classification criteria used by the Tech-
nical Committee at the 1961 are instructive to examine the “degree of liability
to abuse” and “its risk to public health and social welfare.”New Zealand, supra
note 17, at 81. The WHO scientific review process established under the single
convention is designed to permit a rigorous and evidence based evaluation of
medicines that balances risks of abuse against the benefits obtained through
legitimate use. Commentary on the Single Convention, supra note 57, at 563.
199. Commentary on the Single Convention, supra note 57, at 563.
200. Single Convention, supra note 12, art. 3(7).
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Finally, a signatory state may appeal the decision to the U.N.
Economic and Social Council (“ECOSOC”).201
The recent history of relevant actions under these provisions
of the international system does not suggest a likelihood of suc-
cess in removing cannabis from the scope of the treaties. The
first impediment to declassification is that the WHO is reluctant
to issue a definitive statement concerning the misclassification
of cannabis. For example, in August, 1995, the WHO released a
report, which concluded that “cannabis poses amuch less serious
public health problem than is currently posed by alcohol and to-
bacco in Western societies.”202 However, the 1997 final version
of the report retracted the comparative statement, officially be-
cause of scientific judgment, and unofficially due to political
pressure from other international leaders.203 The other problem
is that the CND has refused to reschedule other substances such
as dronabinol, a type of THC, despite the WHO’s recommenda-
tion.204 Based on this precedent, it is unlikely that cannabis
could successfully be descheduled.
D. Amendment
An alternative way to change the scope of the international
drug treaties is to make a formal amendment. The first step in
the amendment process is to remove any mention of cannabis
from the current treaties, and the second is to change the scope
201. Room, supra note 6, at 152.
202. Jelsma, supra note 152, at 190.
203. Id. Jelsma quotes the 1997 version of the final report, “the group of ex-
perts who prepared the review of the current knowledge about cannabis in
1995 included a section in the draft report which attempted to compare what
is known about the health effects of cannabis to the health hazards of a variety
of licit and illicit drugs with psychoactive effects such as alcohol, tobacco and
opiates. However, the reliability and public health significance of such compar-
isons are doubtful. . . .The quantitative risk of cannabis use are largely un-
known in the absence of reliable epidemiological studies, and therefore such
comparisons tend to be more speculative than scientific.” Id.
204. UNODC, E/CN.7/2007/16, Decision 50/2 (2007). The CND decided not to
vote on whether to re-schedule THC, and they request that the WHO make
another review when more information is available. The report that the CND
found inconclusive was the WHO EXPERT COMMITTEE ON DRUG DEPENDENCE,
THIRTY-THIRDREPORT, Mar. 17, 2003, which definitively stated that “the abuse
liability of dronabinol is expected to remain very low so long as cannabis con-
tinues to be readily available. The Committee considered that the abuse liabil-
ity of dronabinol does not constitute a substantial risk to public health and
society.”
680 BROOK. J. INT’L L. [Vol. 40:2
of the treaty’s control for all drugs.205 Any party could propose
an amendment by providing a reasonable explanation for the
amendment to the U.N. Secretary-General.206 In order for the
amendment to pass, there would need to be unanimous consent
among Member States, or, in the event of parties objecting, a
vote in a conference convened by the ECOSOC.207 A unanimous
vote is crucial because the ECOSOC is not obligated to call such
a conference.208 The last possible option is for the U.N.’s General
Assembly to convene to act on the amendment despite signato-
ries’ opposition.209
Both amendments are likely to fail because of precedent. The
only successful amendment to the treaties was the 1972 Protocol
strengthening several provisions in the Single Convention.210
The other proposed amendment, introduced by Bolivia in 2009
regarding coca leaves, was subsequently rejected as a result of
objections made by eighteen countries.211 As the Bolivian exam-
ple illustrates, such changes are unlikely to be approved by con-
sensus. Therefore, amendment of the current cannabis control
treaties is unlikely to succeed, due to the unwieldy process in-
volved and the conservative nature of most U.N. bodies.212
IV. IMPLEMENTING ANEW INTERNATIONAL TREATY FOR
CANNABIS
As shown in Section III, there is no feasible way to change the
status of cannabis within the framework of the current treaty.
Since countries, particularly the United States, want to remain
205. Single Convention, supra note 12, art. 47; 1988 Convention, supra note
12, art. 31. Regulation would involve the amendment of articles 19, 21, and 36
to exclude cannabis and cannabis resin, while legalization would involve
amendment of articles 28, 29, 30, and 31.
206. Single Convention, supra note 12, art. 47; 1988 Convention, supra note
12, art. 31.
207. Single Convention, supra note 12, art. 47; 1988 Convention, supra note
12, art. 31.
208. Commentary on the Single Convention, supra note 57, at 462–63.
209. Id.
210. Bewley-Taylor, supra note 30, at 14.
211. Martin Jelsma, Lifting the Ban on Coca Chewing: Bolivia’s Proposal to
Amend the 1961 Single Convention (Amsterdam: Transnat’l Inst., Series on
Legislative Reform of Drug Policies, No. 11, 2011), available at
http://www.tni.org/briefing/lifting-ban-coca-chewing.
212. See Footnote 13 and 14 for statements from the UNODC and INCB de-
nouncing Uruguay and the United States for their action.
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adherent to prior drug treaties, the only permanent solution is
to formulate a new treaty exclusively for cannabis. The new
treaty should bemodeled after theWHOFramework Convention
on Tobacco Control (“FCTC”), the first public health oriented
treaty aimed specifically at tobacco.213 The FCTC is instructive
because of its provisions obligating Member States to control
both licit and illicit activities.214 The fact that this treaty adopts
an anti-prohibitionist approach to tobacco provides hope that a
future cannabis treaty could likewise move beyond prohibition.
This section will suggest ways in which the international com-
munity could improve upon the FCTC’s foundation in order to
create an effective treaty that countries will adhere to.
In order to ensure that the new treaty absolves Member States
of their former obligations concerning cannabis, the parties
should place a reservation to the Single Convention and 1988
Convention.215 The reservation process would be the clearest
way to ensure that parties will not be bound to the earlier trea-
ties concerning cannabis. While incompatible treaty obligations
concerning cannabis would automatically no longer apply be-
tween parties who ratify both treaties, this does not necessarily
happen if some signatories fail to ratify the latter treaty.216
Therefore, the parties should insert a clause that explicitly ab-
solves the ratifiers of any of their prior treaty obligations, again,
regarding cannabis.217
The FCTC establishes uniform or global minimum standards
for countries to follow concerning the regulation of tobacco pro-
duction, consumption, international trade, trafficking, and ad-
vertisement.218 The recommendations take the force of law only
when subsequent negotiated protocols and amendments by all
213. Foreword toWHOFramework Convention on Tobacco Control, at v, May
21, 2003–June 29, 2004, WHA56.1, 2302 U.N.T.S. 166, 42 I.L.M. 518.
214. FCTC, supra note 213, arts. 6–17.
215. See Part III.B for details about how Member States could place a reser-
vation and re-accede to the remaining portions of the Single Convention and
1988 Convention.
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217. Natasha Balendra, Defining Armed Conflict, 29 CARDOZO L. REV. 2461,
2478 (2008).
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parties create specific commitments.219 The binding commit-
ments only come into effect once there is consensus or three-
fourths of the present parties vote in its favor.220 The establish-
ment of loose guidelines is preferable for cannabis initially, since
the consequences of cannabis legalization and divergent domes-
tic laws concerning cannabis remain unknown. Until detailed re-
search shows the impact of legalization, there should not be re-
quirements binding the states.
Even before definitive results become known, states should
begin to create a framework to control the distribution and pro-
duction of cannabis, in order to retard the development of a large
cannabis industry that could stifle the creation of an effective
future treaty.221 The tobacco industry’s lobbying efforts effec-
tively limited government control of tobacco and weakened the
enforcement mechanisms established by the FCTC.222 Thus, the
earlier the discussions start concerning cannabis, the less likely
it is that political forces would be influenced by the nascent can-
nabis industry.
While the specifics for the cannabis treaty are being formu-
lated, the international community should prepare detailed, an-
nual reports concerning the impact of domestic cannabis legali-
zation on a local and international level. The FCTC only requires
state reports concerning the implementation of the treaty’s rec-
ommendations domestically, which lack assurance that the find-
ings are comprehensive or objective.223 In order to prevent this
data collection problem for cannabis, state findings should be
crosschecked with nongovernmental organizations and neigh-
boring countries’ reports on the international impact of domestic
219. Melissa E. Crow, Smokescreens and State Responsibility: Using Human
Rights Strategies To Promote Global Tobacco Control, 29 YALE J. INT’L L. 209,
216 (2004); FCTC, supra note 213, art. 23(5).
220. Id. art. 28.
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Great American Industry, CNBC (Jan. 14, 2014, 7:51 AM),
http://www.cnbc.com/id/101314084.
222. Chaun-feng Wu, State Responsibility For Tobacco Control: The Right to
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legislation.224 Conferences should be held annually to evaluate
the status of cannabis use, trade, and production globally.
After five years of detailed findings, nations should reconvene
to formulate a flexible treaty on cannabis that takes into account
the criminal justice, public health, and political concerns of pos-
sible parties. The specifics of what a negotiated treaty would ul-
timately look like are unclear at this point because the consen-
sus of international opinion is continuing to evolve, and the le-
galization of cannabis is new. However, the one crucial aspect of
the treaty is that it abandon the prohibitionist stance that has
proven to be inefficient, ineffective, and grossly harmful.
CONCLUSION
The legalization of cannabis in Uruguay, Colorado, and Wash-
ington marks the first time that domestic cannabis laws have
directly conflicted with international drug conventions. In re-
sponse, international bodies have called for the retraction of
these domestic laws, even while politicians in other nations have
begun to court the adoption of similar laws. This worldwide mo-
mentum toward liberalization reflects a growing sentiment that
cannabis is disproportionately regulated in international law
and highlights the ineffectiveness of prohibition. Since there is
no feasible way to change the status of cannabis within the cur-
rent framework, while ensuring international oversight for the
fledgling cannabis market, a new treaty specifically aimed at
cannabis is necessary. Implementing a more flexible treaty will
allow states to focus their attention on more harmful drugs and
enact policies reflective of domestic goals.
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